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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The two appeals involving Crossroads present two basic 
issues. The first issue is whether the district court properly 
granted summary judgment on Rasmussen's claim for breach of an 
alleged oral lease agreement. That issue involves 
consideration of the following: 
1. Whether the plaintiff Rasmussen alleged 
facts sufficient to invoke the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel as a bar to application of the statute of 
frauds? 
2. Whether there are sufficient memoranda of 
the alleged oral agreement, subscribed by Crossroads, 
to satisfy the statute of frauds? 
3. Whether any of the acts alleged by plaintiff 
Rasmussen constituted part performance of the alleged 
oral lease agreement? 
The issue presented by the second appeal is whether 
the district court erred in rejecting plaintiff's attempt to 
raise fraud as an affirmative defense to Crossroad's 
counterclaim for unpaid rent under a written lease. That issue 
involves consideration of the following: 
1. Whether the duty to plead an affirmative 
defense is satisfied by an answer filed nearly one 
year after it became due? 
2. Whether Rasmussen waived his claim of fraud 
by occupying the leased space and accepting the 
benefits of the lease for nearly five years before 
asserting his claim? 
3. Whether the statute of limitations applies 
when fraud is asserted as a defense? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The Utah statute of frauds is dispositive of 
Rasmussen1s claims for breach of an alleged oral lease 
agreement. The applicable provisions state: 
No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, 
nor any trust or power over or concerning real 
property or in any manner relating thereto, shall 
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or 
declared otherwise than by act or operation of 
law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by 
writing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1984). 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any 
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void 
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
Ld. § 25-5-3. 
The rules of civil procedure requiring that 
affirmative defenses be set forth in a timely responsive 
pleading are dispositive of the appeal from summary judgment on 
Crossroads1 counterclaim. The applicable provisions state: 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and 
satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption 
of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in 
bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of 
consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by 
fellow servant, laches, license, payment, 
release, res judicata, statute of frauds statute 
of limitations, waiver, and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense. When a party has mistakenly designated 
a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as 
a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there 
had been a proper designation. 
Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A defendant shall serve his answer within 20 days 
after the service of the summons is complete 
(unless the court directs otherwise, as provided 
by Rule 65B), unless otherwise expressly provided 
by statute or order of the court. A party served 
with a pleading stating a cross-claim against him 
shall serve an answer thereto within 20 days 
after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall 
serve his reply to a counterclaim in the answer 
within 20 days after service of the answer or, if 
a reply is ordered by the court, within 20 days 
after service of the order, unless the order 
otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters these periods of time as 
follows, unless a different time is fixed by 
order of the court: (1) if the court denies the 
motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading 
shall be served within 10 days after notice of 
the court's action; (2) if the court grants a 
motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within 10 
days the service of the more definite statement. 
Rule 12(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as 
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no 
motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that 
the defense of failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, the defense of 
failure to join an indispensable party, and the 
objection of failure to state a legal defense to 
a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if 
one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on 
the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and 
except (2) that, whenever it appears by 
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the 
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject-matter, 
the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall 
be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the 
light of any evidence that may have been received. 
Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The statute of limitations applicable to claims based 
on fraud is also dispositive of the appeal from summary 
judgment on the counterclaim. 
Within three years.--
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud 
or mistake; but the cause of action in such case 
shall not be deemed to have accrued until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (1977). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Rasmussen has appealed from three separate 
judgments on two unrelated claims. The first appeal concerns 
Rasmussen1s claim that both Deseret Federal and Crossroads 
breached an alleged oral agreement requiring Deseret Federal to 
release certain space on Level One of the Crossroads Mall to 
Crossroads in order for Crossroads to lease the same space to 
Rasmussen. On December 10, 1984, District Judge Sawaya entered 
summary judgment in favor of Deseret Federal on the grounds 
that enforcement of the alleged oral agreement was barred by 
the statute of frauds. Crossroads thereafter moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that Crossroads could not possibly be 
required to lease space to Rasmussen that Deseret Federal would 
not relinquish. Crossroads1 motion was granted on January 7, 
1985. 
The second appeal relates to Crossroads1 counterclaim 
for rents due from Rasmussen pursuant to a separate lease of 
separate space on Level Two of the Crossroads Mall which 
Rasmussen occupied from November, 1980, until the day he 
abandoned the premises immediately after the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Crossroads on May 20, 1985. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. Alleged Agreement For Lease of Deseret 
Federal's Level One Space. 
In July of 1982, Rasmussen contacted Bruce Barcal 
regarding the possibility of taking over certain space on Level 
One of the Crossroads Mall then occupied by Deseret Federal. 
R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 19). Barcal was a leasing agent 
employed by Kravco, Inc. which manages the Crossroads Mall for 
the owner. Crossroads. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 12, p. 2). 
Rasmussen informed Barcal that Deseret Federal had "tentatively 
agreed" to release the space in question, subject to 
Crossroads1 permission, in order for Crossroads to lease the 
space to Rasmussen. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 19). Barcal 
indicated that he needed permission from Crossroads before 
negotiations could proceed. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 20-21). 
At a second meeting in July, Barcal indicated that 
Crossroads had given permission for Rasmussen to proceed with 
his negotiations with Deseret Federal. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 
25). At that time Rasmussen understood that Barcal was simply 
a "negotiating lease agent" and that "whatever documents were 
generated would have to be approved by the owner." R. 175 
(Rasmussen Depo. 26). 
Subsequent to the July, 1982 meetings, Barcal informed 
Rasmussen that the negotiations for space on Level One would 
not proceed unless Rasmussen paid certain construction costs 
(approximately $2,400) relating to Rasmussen1s space on Level 
Two of the Crossroads Mall. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 26-27). 
Rasmussen testified by way of sworn affidavit that he was told 
"that Crossroads would negotiate for a lease of new space (then 
occupied by Deseret Federal) only if affiant paid the disputed 
construction charges." R. 239, If 3. Rasmussen paid the 
disputed construction costs over a six-month period between 
August of 1982 and January of 1983. R. 157. 
By letter dated December 30, 1982, Barcal informed 
Deseret Federal that he was "very close to putting together a 
transaction" and requested Deseret Federal's "corporate 
approval to proceed with the lease negotiation." R. 175 
(Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 11). Deseret Federal supplied a copy of 
the letter to Rasmussen R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 29-30). 
Rasmussen understood the letter to refer to a prospective 
tenant other than Rasmussen and he expressed to Barcal his 
displeasure with Barcal "circumventing" their "negotiation". 
R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 30). Rasmussen also told Barcal "that 
he should contact Deseret Federal because that is the nature of 
the negotiation, that they had intended to lease to none other 
but Vaughn Rasmussen1s. Inc." Id. 
In a subsequent meeting in January, 1983, Rasmussen 
reiterated his and Deseret Federal's position that "we had been 
negotiating all these many months and unless there was an 
agreement with Deseret Federal and Vaughn Rasmussen1s to take 
over that space that there was no agreement." R. 175 
(Rasmussen Depo. 32). 
Deseret Federals position and conditions for an 
agreement were set forth in a letter, dated January 13, 1983, 
that Rasmussen brought to the January meeting. R. 175 
(Rasmussen Depo. 35, Depo. Ex. 2). The letter recited that 
Deseret Federal and Vaughn Rasmussen "had been negotiating a 
proposal" and purported to give Barcal "the authority necessary 
to manage the proposal" upon certain conditions, including the 
execution of additional agreements between Deseret Federal and 
Rasmussen. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 2). The conditional 
authority would expire on March 15, 1983. T&. The tentative, 
nonbinding nature of the proposal was reiterated by Deseret 
Federal's statement that "If for any reason Vaughn Rasmussen 
should choose to discontinue his plans to occupy the subject 
space, Deseret Federal is not interested in any further 
proposals." Ld. Rasmussen later testified that the letter was 
consistent with the negotiations that had taken place up to 
that time. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 75-76). 
Rasmussen claims that Barcal promised on numerous 
occasions that the necessary lease documents would be sent by 
Kravco, Inc., and that on two separate occasions in February, 
1983, Barcal promised that the documents would be delivered to 
Rasmussen by a certain date. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 45-46). 
On March 9, 1983, Rasmussen addressed a letter to Barcal 
stating that he had to have the leases by March 11. 1982 in 
order to meet the deadline imposed by Deseret Federal. R. 175 
(Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 3). Rasmussen threatened legal action 
against Barcal and Kravco. Inc. (but not Crossroads) if the 
"deal fails due to lack of follow-through either by you or 
Kravco." Ld. Rasmussen testified that he felt Barcal had been 
negligent. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 46). 
On the same date, March 9, 1983, Barcal addressed a 
letter to Deseret Federal which stated that Crossroads intended 
to release Deseret Federal from the space in question and lease 
it to Rasmussen. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 4). The letter 
advised that Kravco. Inc. was providing lease forms which "you 
should be receiving. . . in approximately five (5) business 
days." Id. 
Prior to Deseret Federal's unilaterally imposed 
deadline of March 15. 1983, Deseret Federal informed Rasmussen 
that it did not want to release the space and began negotiating 
a sublease with Rasmussen. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 48. 63). 
Deseret Federal requested Crossroads1 consent to the sublease 
on March 23. 1983. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 5). Crossroads 
was opposed to the sublease proposal but was still willing to 
pursue the original proposal. Thus, despite Deseret Federal's 
and Rasmussen1s change of plans. Kravco. Inc. proceeded to 
prepare the promised lease and lease surrender forms and 
delivered those to Rasmussen on April 13. 1983. R. 175 
(Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 8). The documents provided by Kravco, 
Inc. were never executed by either Deseret Federal or 
Rasmussen. R. 129, 1f 4. Similarly, the "additional 
agreements" between Rasmussen and Deseret Federal which Deseret 
Federal required to be executed by March 15, 1983, were never 
executed. Id. 
Rasmussen contends that he incurred several expenses 
in reliance on the alleged promises of Deseret Federal and 
Crossroads. 
II. Crossroads1 Counterclaim For Rents Due On 
Rasmussen1s Space On Mall Level Two. 
In May of 1980, Vaughn Rasmussen entered into a lease 
for space on Level Two of the Crossroads Mall which was then 
under construction. R. 239, If 3. The Crossroads Mall was 
completed and opened in August of 1980. R. 175 (Rasmussen 
Depo. 19). Prior to the opening of the Mall, Rasmussen 
determined that he would not be prepared to open his shoe store 
when the Mall opened and requested that the rent be abated 
until the shoe store opened for business. R. 175 (Rasmussen 
Depo. 17). Crossroads agreed to the abatement of rent and 
Rasmussen opened for business in late October or early November 
of 1980. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 18). Rasmussen continued to 
occupy the Level II space at least until the time of 
Crossroads1 motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim. 
R. 226. 
On May 25, 1984, Crossroads filed its counterclaim 
against Rasmussen, alleging that Rasmussen had failed to make 
his monthly rental payments for November. 1983 and all 
subseguent months. R. 74. 
At his deposition on July 5. 1984, Rasmussen admitted 
that he was behind in his rent payments and that the rent was 
owed to Crossroads. R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 73-74). At no 
time during the deposition did Rasmussen suggest that the lease 
for the Level Two space was unenforceable or affected by fraud 
in any way. 
On March 28, 1985, Crossroads moved for summary 
judgment on its counterclaim. R. 176-78. The hearing on the 
motion was set for April 15, 1985. R. 227-229. The hearing 
was later re-set for May 6, 1985. R. 230-232. On May 1, 1985, 
just two business days before the hearing and more than 11 
months after Rasmussen1s answer to the counterclaim was due, 
Rasmussen1s counsel mailed an answer to the counterclaim, 
together with an affidavit, asserting that Rasmussen was not 
obligated to pay rent because of an alleged misrepresentation 
made prior to May of 1980. R. 234-242. The alleged 
misrepresentation was that Crossroads1 leasing agent indicated 
an intent to construct a walkway across Main Street between the 
second levels of the Crossroads Mall and the ZCMI Mall. R. 
239-240. No such walkway was ever built on any level of the 
Crossroads Mall. 
District Judge Sawaya granted summary judgment on the 
counterclaim ruling that Crossroads' affidavit stating the 
amounts owing was uncontroverted and that Rasmussen's "claimed 
defenses will not lie." R. 244. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court properly granted summary judgment 
on Rasmussen's claim against Crossroads for breach of an 
alleged oral lease agreement. The correspondence between the 
parties and the testimony of Vaughn Rasmussen show that no 
lease agreement was ever entered into. The lengthy 
negotiations involving three principals and one agent required 
a coordination of acts which never occurred and, as a result, 
the proposed deal fell through. 
Even if the Court accepts all of Rasmussen1s 
contentions (that Crossroads promised to execute a written 
lease agreement and that Rasmussen acted to his detriment in 
reliance on Crossroads' promise), those alleged facts are not 
sufficient to prevent the application of the statute of 
frauds. Nor are the facts alleged by Rasmussen sufficient to 
satisfy the statute of frauds either by sufficient memoranda or 
part performance. 
Summary judgment on Crossroads' counterclaim was also 
proper. Rasmussen's failure to allege fraud as a defense until 
nearly a year had passed since the filing of Crossroads' 
counterclaim constituted a waiver of the defense. That 
Rasmussen had proceeded to occupy his leased space and 
continued to occupy the space for more than four and one-half 
years after the alleged fraud occurred and that he occupied the 
space for more than 18 months without paying any rent before he 
ever suggested that he would claim fraud as a defense also 
constituted a waiver of the fraud claim. Because the statute 
of limitations had run on Rasmussen's fraud claim before 
Crossroad's claim for rent had accrued, the assertion of fraud 
as a defense was also time-barred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Properly Granted Summary 
Judgment On Rasmussen's Claims Against 
Crossroads For Breach Of The Alleged Oral 
Lease Agreement. 
Appellant Rasmussen concedes that the alleged oral 
lease agreement between Deseret Federal, Rasmussen and 
Crossroads comes within the Utah statute of frauds which 
reguires that leases for a term exceeding one year must be in 
writing and must be subscribed by the party assigning or 
surrendering the leasehold interest. Utah Code Annotated, 
§25-5-1 (1984). Rasmussen asserts however that both Crossroads 
and Deseret Federal are barred from asserting the statute of 
frauds as a defense by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
Rasmussen further asserts that there are sufficient written 
memoranda and sufficient acts of part performance to satisfy 
the reguirements of the statute of frauds. The facts of record 
in this case, however, interpreted in the light most favorable 
to Rasmussen, create no genuine issue of material fact 
sufficient to support any of Rasmussen's theories. 
The brief of Deseret Federal correctly sets forth the 
applicable law regarding each of Rasmussen1s theories and 
Crossroads adopts by reference the arguments of Deseret 
Federal. The application of law to the particular facts 
involving Crossroads is set forth below. 
A. There Is No Basis For Rasmussen1s Claim 
of Promissory Estoppel. 
Rasmussen contends that Crossroads should be estopped 
from asserting the statute of frauds as a defense because its 
leasing agent, Kravco, Inc., allegedly promised to provide 
lease and lease release forms to Rasmussen on various 
occasions. Rasmussen contends that he relied on the promises 
of Kravco, Inc., when he obtained an SBA loan, incurred various 
expenses relating to the improvements of the space to be 
leased, and paid disputed construction costs relating to space 
that he already occupied on the Level Two of the Crossroads 
Mall. The record in this case controverts the assertions of 
Rasmussen on appeal. But even if accepted as true, those 
allegations do not meet the threshold requirements established 
by this Court for the application of the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel. 
The controlling authority in Utah makes it absolutely 
clear that: 
A mere promise to execute a written contract and 
a subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to 
create an estoppel, although reliance is placed 
on such a promise and damage is sustained as a 
consequence of the refusal. The acts and conduct 
of the promissor must so clearly manifest an 
intention that he will not assert the statute 
that to permit him to do so would be to work a 
fraud upon the other party. 
McKinnon v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434, 436-37 (Utah 1974). 
In this case there is no allegation, nor any fact of record to 
support an allegation that Crossroads ever manifested an 
intention that it would abandon an existing right or that it 
intented to waive the statute of frauds. To the contrary, the 
facts alleged by Rasmussen establish that if there was any 
point on which all of the parties agreed, it was that unless 
and until various written agreements were executed (some of 
which did not even involve Crossroads), there was no agreement 
at all. 
Furthermore, the facts alleged by Rasmussen don't even 
amount to a refusal to execute a written contract. The most 
that can be said is that Kravco, Inc. failed to deliver the 
written lease forms as quickly as it had promised. The only 
parties that refused to execute the forms were Deseret Federal 
and Rasmussen himself. In Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 
P.2d 570 (1953), the defendant promised to execute a written 
conveyance of property and when informed that the plaintiff 
intended to purchase adjacent property in reliance on the 
defendant's promise, assured the plaintiff that he would sign 
the conveyance. The defendant later refused to sign the 
conveyance after learning that the property he had promised to 
convey was a "hot" property. Id. at 260 P.2d 574. The Court 
found that this conduct was not sufficient to give rise to 
promissory estoppel. If the defendant in Ravarino was not 
estopped from backing out of a promise to execute a written 
conveyance, which was relied upon by the plaintiff, simply 
because he believed he could get a better deal elsewhere, 
clearly Crossroads cannot be estopped from asserting the 
statute of frauds simply because its agent Kravco, Inc. failed 
to deliver the lease agreement before the other parties, 
Deseret Federal and Rasmussen, decided to change the deal. 
Crossroads never refused and remained willing to execute the 
documents implementing the original lease proposal. If the 
facts of this case do give rise to promissory estoppel, then 
the statute of frauds is without meaning. 
B. There Are No Written Memoranda Subs-
cribed By Crossroads Which Satisfy The 
Statute Of Frauds. 
Rasmussen contends that a letter from Bruce Barcal 
(presumably the letter expressing Crossroads1 intent to release 
Deseret Federal from its space) combined with the unsigned 
lease form provided by Kravco, Inc., constitute sufficient 
written memoranda of the alleged oral lease to satisfy the 
statute of frauds. In order to satisfy the statute of frauds 
the signed writings must acknowledge that a contact has been 
entered into. Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412, 
242 P.2d 578, 580 (1952). The documents relied upon by 
Rasmussen were neither signed by Crossroads, nor did they 
indicate that a contract had been entered into. 
Rasmussen knew and so testified that the lease 
documents to be produced by Barcal remained subject to approval 
by Crossroads: 
Q. You understood that Mr. Barcal was the 
negotiating lease agent and whatever documents 
were generated would have to be approved by the 
owner? 
A.. That's correct. 
R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. 26). The letter accompanying the lease 
form confirmed Rasmussen1s understanding, stating that the 
submission of the lease form did not "impose any obligation 
upon either party until the execution of such document by the 
Landlord. . . . " R. 175 (Rasmussen Depo. Ex. 8). Rasmussen 
had already entered into one lease with Crossroads and knew the 
procedures to be followed. Under such circumstances there is 
no question but that Crossroads never executed any written 
memoranda acknowledging that a contract had been entered into. 
The documents relied upon by Rasmussen therefore fail, as a 
matter of law, to satisfy the statute of frauds. 
C. None Of The Facts Alleged By Rasmussen 
Constitute Part Performance Of The 
Alleged Oral Lease Agreement. 
Rasmussen contends that the statute of frauds is 
satisfied by certain acts performed in reliance on the alleged 
oral lease agreement. As Deseret Federal points out, none of 
the alleged acts of performance are exclusively referrable to 
the actual performance of the alleged oral lease agreement and 
therefore do not constitute part performance. See, Martin v. 
Scholl, 678 P.2d 274 (Utah 1983). The plans made, the bids 
taken, and the expenses incurred in anticipation of remodeling 
the Level One space were merely preparatory acts and were 
equally consistent with Rasmussen's proposal to sublease from 
Deseret Federal as with his proposal to lease the space from 
Crossroads. The SBA loan and the purchase of inventory were 
also equally consistent with the continued operation of 
Rasmussen1s shoe store on Level Two or, for that matter, a shoe 
store anywhere in the city. 
The payment of construction costs on the Level Two 
lease is so directly related to that lease that under no 
circumstances could it be said to be unequivocally related to 
performance of the alleged Level One lease. Furthermore, 
Rasmussen1s own testimony and pleadings refute his present 
contention that the payment constituted performance of the 
Level One oral lease. On appeal, Rasmussen contends that 
Crossroads entered into the oral lease agreement in August of 
1982 and that the agreement required the payment of 
construction costs relating to the Level Two space. Rasmussen 
Brief at 5. He claims that he paid those costs (amounting to 
$2,400.00) between August of 1982 and January of 1983. Id. In 
his Amended Complaint, however. Rasmussen asserts that 
Crossroads agreed to the Level One lease after Deseret Federal 
authorized Crossroads to conclude the transaction by its letter 
of January 13, 1983. R. 3. By that date most if not all of 
the construction costs had been paid. 
Rasmussen1s sworn testimony further confirms that the 
payment of the Level Two construction costs did not constitute 
performance of the alleged Level One lease. Rasmussen1s 
affidavit of May 1, 1985 unequivocally states that Crossroads 
required payment of construction costs on Level Two before it 
would even negotiate a lease for additional space on Level One. 
R. 239. Rasmussen cannot create a genuine issue of material 
fact by merely contradicting his own testimony. Radobenko v. 
Automated Equipment Corporation. 520 F.2d 540, 544 (9th Cir. 
1975). Moreover, even if Rasmussen's contradictory positions 
could create a genuine question as to his reason for paying the 
construction costs, the fact that such a question even exists 
further establishes that the payments were not exclusively 
referrable to performance of the alleged oral lease. 
There is, therefore, no genuine issue of material fact 
concerning the question of part performance. Assuming that 
Rasmussen did perform all of the acts that he relies on, none 
of those acts meet the requirements of the doctrine of part 
performance. 
II. The District Court Properly Granted Summary 
Judgment On Crossroads1 Counterclaim For Rents 
Due. 
Five years after executing the lease; four and 
one-half years after opening for business; 18 months after he 
stopped paying rent; 12 months after being sued for breach of 
his covenant to pay rent; and just two business days prior to 
the hearing on Crossroad's motion for summary judgment, 
Rasmussen asserted fraud as an affirmative defense to 
enforcement of the lease agreement. Although Rasmussen had 
been previously deposed regarding the Level Two lease and had 
acknowledged that he owed rent to Crossroads R. 175 (Rasmussen 
Depo. 73-74), his last minute affidavit and answer to the 
counterclaim asserted that he was not obligated to pay rent. 
The district court properly refused to permit 
Rasmussen to extend his 18 month rent-free operation of his 
Level Two shoe store by raising a surprise claim of fraud for 
the purpose of preventing summary judgment. There were at 
least three separate grounds, each of which was sufficient by 
itself, to support District Judge Sawaya's determination that 
"plaintiff's claimed defenses will not lie." R. 244. Those 
grounds are: (1) Rasmussen's failure to plead the affirmative 
defense of fraud on a timely basis constituted a waiver of the 
defense; (2) Rasmussen1s actions after learning of the fraud 
also constituted a waiver; and (3) Rasmussen1s claim of fraud 
was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
A. Rasmussen Failed To Plead And 
Therefore Waived The Affirmative 
Defense Of Fraud. 
Fraud is an affirmative defense that is waived unless 
set forth in a required responsive pleading. Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Rules 8(c), 12(h). An affirmative defense to 
a counterclaim must be served within 20 days after service of 
the counterclaim. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(a). 
Rasmussen did not answer Crossroads1 counterclaim until more 
than 11 months had expired since the filing of the counterclaim 
and more than one month had expired since the filing of the 
motion for summary judgment. 
In the absence of any reason or excuse (such as an 
agreement with opposing counsel) such a complete disregard of 
the pleading requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure must 
be considered a failure to answer. One who keeps his 
affirmative defense secret for a year after becoming obligated 
to assert it, and who conceals the defense even when questioned 
whether he owed the rent required by the lease, must be deemed 
to have waived the defense. The district court's refusal to 
permit the affirmative defense was the only fair and proper 
decision and was clearly within the district court's discretion. 
B. Rasmussen Waived His Claim Of 
Fraud By His Actions Subsequent To 
Discovery Of The Alleged Fraud. 
Rasmussen1s affidavit states that prior to execution 
of the lease in May of 1980, he was told that Crossroads 
planned to construct a walkway between the second levels of the 
Crossroads and ZCMI malls. R. 239-240, If 5. He claims that 
"following execution of the subject lease agreement" he learned 
that the alleged representations were false. R. 240. If 8. The 
affidavit conspicuously and conveniently fails to specify 
exactly when Rasmussen learned of the alleged fraud. 
In the absence of any facts or allegations to the 
contrary, it must be assumed that Rasmussen realized there 
would be no walkway by the time the Crossroads Mall was 
completed and held its grand opening in August, 1980. Knowing 
that the Crossroads Mall had been completed without the 
walkway, Rasmussen proceeded to occupy his Level Two space and 
began paying rent in November of 1980. Rasmussen continued to 
occupy the space until Crossroads1 motion for summary judgment 
was granted in May of 1985. 
Rasmussen1s acceptance of the leased space and 
continued occupancy for nearly four and one-half years prevents 
Rasmussen from asserting a fraud alleged to have occurred 
several months before performance of the lease began. This 
Court has observed that such actions constitute a waiver of the 
fraud claim: 
We do not question the correctness of the 
defendant's averments that where one has entered 
into a contract where fraud may be involved, and 
after having knowledge of those facts, continues 
to perform or otherwise ratify the contract, he 
is deemed to waive the claim of fraud. Nor that 
one who claims to be defrauded must exercise 
reasonable prudence and diligence in discovering 
it and seeking a remedy therefore, or be 
precluded from doing so. 
Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901 
(Utah 1976). The record in this case creates no genuine issue 
as to the fact that Rasmussen ratified the lease and failed to 
exercise any prudence or diligence in seeking a remedy for the 
alleged fraud. 
This Court's decision in Duqan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 
(Utah 1980) indicates a distinction between waiver of the right 
to rescind a contract for fraud and waiver of the right to 
recover damages. The Court stated that: 
[T]he defrauded party, who does not discover the 
fraud until he has partly performed, may go 
forward with the contract, keep what he has 
received, and still maintain his action for 
damages. 
Id. at 1247 (emphasis added). Although Rasmussen asserted both 
the right to rescind and the right to affirm the lease, his 
right to affirm and recover damages is not preserved by the 
distinction recognized in Duqan v. Jones, supra. That 
distinction requires that the defrauded party begin to perform 
before discovering the fraud. Rasmussen has not even alleged 
that the fraud was not discovered before he began to perform 
the lease, and the facts of record indicate otherwise. Having 
failed to plead facts sufficient to support his affirmative 
defense of fraud, the summary judgment on that claim was proper. 
C. Rasmussen1s Affirmative Defense Of 
Fraud Was Barred By The Statute Of 
Limitations. 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 78-12-26(3) (1977)f 
provides that an action for relief on the ground of fraud must 
be brought within three years of the accrual of the cause of 
action. Rasmussen does not deny that his claims for fraud 
accrued more than three years prior to the date on which he 
asserted fraud as a defense. He only contends that the statute 
of limitations cannot operate to bar an affirmative defense. 
The law in Utah does not support Rasmussen1s claim. 
Rasmussen cites Jacobsen v. Bunker. 699 P.2d 1208 
(Utah 1985). for the proposition that fraud, as a defense or 
counterclaim, is never barred by the statute of limitations. 
Jacobsen. however, held only that where cross-demands 
co-existed at some point in time, such cross-demands may be 
asserted as set-offs against each other notwithstanding the 
statute of limitations. The case relied upon in Jacobsen makes 
it clear that there must have been some point in time when both 
cross-demands would have been timely in order to permit an 
otherwise barred claim to be asserted as a set-off. In Salt 
Lake City v. Telluride Power Co.. 82 Utah 607. 17 P.2d 281 
(1932). the Court clearly held that claims which became barred 
by the statute of limitations prior to the accrual of the 
opposing party's claim could not be asserted as defenses or 
set-offs. Id. at 285. 
The obvious rationale for the limited "set-offs" 
exception to the statute of limitations is that it would be 
unfair to permit one party to benefit by waiting to assert his 
claim until the opponent's claim becomes time-barred. But 
where, as in the Telluride Power case and in the present 
action, the timely action did not accrue before the opposing 
claim had ceased to exist, there is no purpose served by 
reviving the dead claim. In those circumstances there are no 
policy considerations for excusing a party from sitting on his 
rights. 
The facts of record establish that Rasmussen1s claim 
of fraud was barred before he stopped paying rent. He alleges 
that the misrepresentations were made prior to May of 1980. R. 
239-240. Crossroads1 counterclaim was for unpaid rents 
beginning with the month of November, 1983. R. 226. Thus 
Crossroads1 claim arose three years and six months after the 
alleged misrepresentations were made. Even assuming that 
Rasmussen did not discover the alleged fraud until the Mall was 
completed and he saw that there was no walkway, his claim would 
have been barred in August of 1983, still four months prior to 
the accrual of Crossroads1 first claim for rent. 
There are no facts or allegations in the record to 
even suggest that the statute should be tolled beyond August of 
1980. Furthermore, the burden of pleading and proving that the 
statute should be tolled was upon Rasmussen. See, Clawson v. 
Boston Acme Mines Development Co., 72 Utah 137, 269 P. 147 
(1928). In the absence of factual allegations that Rasmussen 
did not discover the fraud until after November of 1980, the 
Court is compelled to conclude that that statute of limitations 
began to run before that date. See, Valley Bank of Nevada v. 
Foster & Marshall, Inc., 585 F.Supp 1351, 1353 (D. Utah 1984). 
Because Rasmussen failed to plead any facts to establish that 
his claim for fraud did not become time-barred before any of 
Crossroads1 claims for rent accrued, Rasmussen1s affirmative 
defense of fraud was absolutely barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
The orders of the district court granting Crossroad's 
motions for summary judgment were proper. 
The facts of record, viewed in the light most 
favorable to Rasmussen. provide no basis for preventing the 
application of the statute of frauds to the alleged oral lease 
agreement. None of the facts alleged by Rasmussen give rise to 
a promissory estoppel. None of the documents of record 
constitute sufficient written memoranda of the alleged 
agreement, and none of Rasmussen1s acts constitute part 
performance. Summary judgment was therefore proper. 
Summary judgment was also proper on Crossroad's 
counterclaim. It was well within the discretion of the 
district court to reject Rasmussen1s untimely attempt to raise 
the affirmative defense of fraud. Furthermore, Rasmussen's 
ratification of the lease, as well as his concealing of his 
claim during discovery, constituted a waiver of the claim. 
Rasmussen's belated claim is also barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
For all of th above reasons, defendant Crossroads 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary 
judgments entered in favor of Crossroads and to dismiss 
plaintiff's appeals. 
Dated this 25th day of November, 1985. 
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